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ABSTRACT 
 
This editorial will introduce a four issue series of Risk, Health & Society special 
editions, ‘Health Care Through the Lens of Risk’. The editorial will argue that risk-
thinking offers a particular approach to contingency, its culturally universal precursor. 
Contingency arises from the perception that one of two or more alternative outcomes 
might occur, or might have occurred. It addresses the infinity of possibility, and is 
properly located in minds rather than the material world in which singular events 
simply happen. The lens of risk renders contingency as the probability of a specified 
adverse event occurring within a particular time period. But each of the elements 
included in this definition can be reframed interpretively: events as categories; 
adversity as negative valuing; probabilities as uncertain expectations; and time 
periods as time frames. The editorial will outline this analysis, introduce the special 
issue series, and briefly review the original research papers included in this first 
special issue which focuses on risk categorisation. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the next year, the authors of this editorial will be guest-editing ‘Health Care 
Through the Lens of Risk’, a series of four Health, Risk & Society special issues 
which will focus on risk-thinking itself, turning attention away from the more usual 
study of particular health risks towards the less common study of health risk. The 
four component special issues will present original research concerned with the role, 
respectively, of categorising, valuing, expecting and time-framing in health risk 
thinking. Each special issue will include interviews with one or more prominent risk 
social scientists. The present editorial will map out the terrain which the series will 
cover. It will also introduce the first topic, risk categorisation in health contexts.  
 
THE LENS OF RISK 
 
The metaphor of risk as a culturally manufactured lens which shapes perceptions is 
often used to challenge naturalistic formulations (e.g. Hunt, 2003; Heyman 2012). 
This metaphor invokes the central role of the encultured, actively interpretive 
observer in the perception of risks. The starting point for the present exploration of 
this metaphor is an interpretivist reframing of the risk definition put forward in the 
Royal Society Risk report (1992, p. 2). This definition, clearly oriented towards the 
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aspiration of objective measurement as the second awkwardly written sentence 
demonstrates1, renders risk as: 
 
the probability (3) that a particular adverse (2) event (3) occurs during a stated 
period of time (4a), or results from a particular challenge (4b). As a probability 
in the sense of statistical theory risk obeys all the formal laws of combined 
probabilities (our additions in brackets). 
 
Although the report is now history, celebrating its 20th birthday in 2012, and would 
not be couched in such militantly positivist terms today, it provides a useful starting 
point for considering the interpretive processes folded into analyses of particular 
‘real’ risks. The definition offers a good starting point for interrogating risk-thinking 
not only because its objectivist predilection captures the reification of particular risks. 
In addition, unusually, it includes a vital temporal reference. None of the 11 types of 
risk definition reviewed by Aven, Renn and Rosa (2011) take time-framing into 
consideration. The specification of a ‘stated period of time’, condition 4a, does so, 
but begs the question of who ‘states’ the temporal horizon for risk analysis and why. 
Resulting from a particular challenge, condition 4b, opens up an indefinite time frame 
which continues until the causal chain of adverse events associated with a risk factor 
works itself out. However, an indefinite time frame renders expected value 
incalculable, a problem which has led, for example, to the widespread but arbitrary 
acceptance of five-year survival in drug trials. Moreover, many causal chains 
continue indefinitely, and may extend across generations, as with the epigenetic 
effects of famine, and with emotional harm caused by child sexual abuse, making 
causal chain end-points difficult to determine.  
 
The Royal Society definition unreflectively adopted the natural attitude (Schutz, 
1962) towards a socially constructed phenomenon. Each of the four numbered 
components can be interpretively reframed, so that ‘events’ are turned into 
categories; the ‘adverse’ into negative (counterbalanced by positive) valuing; 
probabilities into uncertain expectations; and time periods into time frames. It can be 
objected that revisiting this question merely invokes hoary debates about 
positivism/relativism. However, in the many social settings where risk-thinking is 
employed by at least some social actors, the natural attitude mostly rules, with risks 
treated as if they are material phenomena which can be directly observed and 
measured. Hence, analysis which challenges the natural attitude to risk can offer 
useful critical insights into its concealed problematics. Inter alia, it offers a critical 
perspective on forms of healthcare which are predicated on implicit but contested 
values, the focus of the second special issue in this series2. Although the ontology 
and epistemology of risk have by no means been clearly resolved (Aven, Renn and 
Rosa, 2011), and perhaps never will be, presuppositions about the issues listed 
                                            
1
 The interview in this special issue with Nick Pidgeon, one of the main social science contributors to the Royal 
Society (1992) Risk report, provides an interesting historical context relating to the heated debate which arose  
within the Royal Society at that time about the objectivity of risks. 
2
 The traditional interpretive approach to health and other risks provides a surprisingly powerful analytical 
tool, which can withstand postmodern critiques of social scientific claims to privileged access, because it 
confronts the natural attitude to risk. The latter may appear dated, as is  the Royal Society (1992) Risk report. 
But the interpretive approach continues to offer illuminative insights into everyday attitudes towards risks. 
Anyone who manages a particular risk has to treat it as 'real' in order to avoid being paralysed by Hamlet-like 
doubts. 
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above carry many implications for practice, for example when health risk assessment 
is viewed as entirely resolvable through scientific methods.  
 
Much can be learnt by taking into consideration the interplay between interpretivist 
and objectivist approaches to risks. A ubiquitous tension between the heuristic value 
of treating risks as real and the ontological and epistemological vulnerability of 
specific risk descriptions can be detected. For example, as of 2012, financial markets 
and governments still dance to the tune of discredited credit-rating agencies which 
failed to identify the enormous risks associated with the banking fiasco of 2007. 
Following the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011, the Japanese government 
created a circular 20km exclusion zone surrounded by a further 10km intermediate 
risk limbo even though it was widely recognised that radiation does not spread in 
neat circles. Psychiatrists continue to rely on endlessly shifting mental disorder 
classifications, disregarding their evident arbitrariness (Manning, 2000). In these and 
many other cases, socially organised risk management must proceed, faute de 
mieux, as if risks have been solidly identified and assessed, at least until a prevailing 
but ultimately fragile tacit consensus breaks down. It may be speculatively 
hypothesised that faith in prevailing risk delineations correlates with height of 
position in societal hierarchies. Those who are charged with managing a risk can 
least afford to doubt its delineation. 
 
Defining Risk 
 
Before further considering the ‘lens of risk’, it is politic to review current debates 
about the utility of even attempting to define this slippery context. Most of the recent 
plethora of social science risk texts ignore conceptual issues entirely, or raise them 
incidentally rather than centrally. These analyses implicitly treat risks as material 
phenomena to be explained, like lightening or supernovae, thereby unreflectively 
endorsing the natural attitude towards risks. Even an excellent collection of 
philosophical papers (Lewens, 2007, p.2), working in the discipline which might be 
most concerned with risk-thinking itself, leaps into a discussion of ‘risky options’ 
without asking what makes an option ‘risky’. Luhmann (1993, p.22) identified 
‘carelessness in concept formation’, whilst, nearly 20 years later, Aven (2011, p. 33) 
referred to a situation ‘characterised by many weakly justified and inconsistent 
notions about risk’. Rosa (2003, p. 55) went further, diagnosing ‘an intentional 
silence about defining risk at all’ in the literature. However, the accusation of 
scholarly blindness, conspiratorial or not, has itself been challenged by those who 
question the meaningfulness of trying to define ‘risk’. Hansson (2005, p. 7) dismissed 
as the ‘first myth of risk’, the idea that risk ‘must have a single, well-defined 
meaning’. Power (2007, p. viii) cautioned that nouns such as risk can mislead 
because ‘they suggest that a clear object exists when this is often not the case’, and 
makes his own point of departure ‘the surely uncontestable fact that the noun has 
grown in use and significance in organizational life’.  
 
A starting point which interrogates the potentially variable ways in which culturally 
immersed social actors use the concept of risk offers a significant advance over 
approaches which seek to describe the essence of risks viewed as substantive 
phenomena. The former pragmatic analysis, of meaning in terms of use, opens up 
the possibility that usage variations in different societal domains are concealed by a 
common linguistic tag, or even that the term ‘risk’ has been stretched so far that it no 
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longer means anything. However, such a position cannot avoid indirectly debunking 
the implicit assumption that use of a single semantic unit across many domains 
reflects at least some degree of shared meaning. Social scientists thereby place 
themselves, however unintentionally, in opposition to the rest of humanity, or at least 
to those who live in societies which employ the lens of risk. It is possible to 
demonstrate inconsistency even in self-validating cultural products such as shared 
meanings. But an alternative analysis can be generated by beginning with the 
question of how encultured social actors, including risk social scientists, may actually 
use risk-thinking to link a diversity of domains, including health and social care, 
crime, business, politics, sport, the arts, weather forecasting, travel and close 
relationships, a remarkable but unremarked everyday accomplishment3. 
 
A Definition of Risk 
 
One way of beginning to understand what social actors do when they look at the 
world through the lens of risk is to uncover the largely concealed interpretive work 
entailed by the adoption of metaphorical risk spectacles. A possible starting point for 
this endeavour is summarised in Table 1 below. This table sets out the 
recommended reframing of the four elements folded into the Royal Society (1992) 
definition as questions of interpretation, and thereby of social negotiation, power and 
interest. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE. 
 
The lower part of the table sketches the carry-over from risk-thinking to risk 
management, by no means definitively. A two-way relationship between these two 
concerns can be identified. For instance, a drug company seeking to promote one of 
its products might want to talk up the seriousness (negative value) of the health 
condition it is directed at, and emphasise its prevalence (probability)4. The nuclear 
power industry has argued for a relatively short time-frame of 500 years with respect 
to assessing its unwanted legacy, thereby pushing most of the period in which waste 
will continue to be radioactive outside a constructed temporal event horizon 
(Atherton and French, 1999). One advantage of viewing risk identification, 
assessment and management from an interpretive framework is that it allows their 
relationships to be problematised, challenging the ‘identify-assess-manage’ model of 
risk rationality. In both of the above examples, a preferred risk management 
‘solution’ defines a risk, rather than vice versa5. 
                                            
3
 The risk ‘superpower’ can be located in a family of terms (Skolbekken,  1995) which convey different 
attitudes towards contingencies framed as risks. Selection of ‘danger’ conveys the speaker’s view that a risk 
ought to be avoided, whilst ‘vulnerability’ points up intrinsic weaknesses of a person or other entity. 
‘Uncertainty’ invites delay until further evidence is obtained. Such lexical choices are driven pragmatically 
rather than by inherent differences between types of contingency  (Heyman et al., 2010, pp. 25-29). 
4
 For a gripping exposé see ‘Big Bucks, Big Pharma: Marketing Disease and Pushing Drugs’ at  
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lKP_ISD3rvQ. According to US advertisements, ‘restless leg syndrome’ 
seriously damages the life quality of 1 in 10 Americans, but can be cured by taking the appropriate drug. Such 
cringe-making but sinister examples illustrate in extremis the interpretive socio-political processes which can 
lie concealed in the identification of an ‘adverse event’. 
5
 As these examples illustrate, the four identified elements of risk thinking are interrelated, so that, for 
example, altering the time frame within which a risk is considered or the inclusivity of a risk category will 
change its  probability of occurrence. 
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Aven (2011) concluded from a historical survey of the risk research literature6 that 
there has been a shift away from  narrowly probabilistic approaches towards those 
which emphasise events, consequences and uncertainty, thereby drawing attention 
to the risk observer; but that objectivist approaches still strongly influence the field 
when real-life decisions are to be made about the management of particular risks. It 
is possible to combine these approaches in a single analytical framework by viewing 
the four elements shown in the top right-hand column of Table 1 (categorising, 
valuing, expecting and time-framing) as a pre-cultural precursor of societally 
constructed risk-thinking. These four elements, or a similar list, reference 
contingency, not risk, and point to a kind of mental stem cell, a primitive which arises 
out of the universal human mental capacity to envisage multiple futures or pasts. To 
think contingently involves believing that one of two or more identified outcomes 
might occur, or might have occurred7. Contingency is located in minds, not in the 
material world8, where unique events merely happen9.Culture shapes this primitive at 
two levels: through establishing a prevailing cosmology which specifies how and why 
metamorphoses from possible to actual take place, e.g. via divine decision-making 
or the operation of chance; and, secondly, through selection of a small number of 
contingencies from the infinity of possibility for socially organised concern. Members 
of societies in which contingency is understood in terms of risk tend to be drawn 
inexorably towards ‘observing’ particular risks. These considerations justify a wordy 
but accurate definition of risk as ‘the projection of uncertain expectation, viewed in 
terms of randomness, about the occurrence of a negatively valued outcome category 
within a selected time frame’ (Heyman et al., 2010, p. 19). 
 
The present special issue series will explore the four risk elements itemised in Table 
1 through research which highlights interpretive processes of categorisation, valuing, 
expectation-building and time-framing. 
 
HEALTH RISK CATEGORISATION 
 
This special issue will focus on ‘events’ in the Royal Society (1992) and many other 
treatments of risk and risks, which will be reframed as ‘categories’. The advocated 
sceptical attitude towards relationships between the unique events which occur in 
the physical world and their categorisation is well-captured by the following quotation 
(Lakoff, 1987, quoted by Bowker and Starr, 2000, p. 33): 
 
                                            
6
 As noted by Nick Pidgeon whose views are presented in this issue, a fissure has developed between risk 
researchers concerned primarily with system safety who publish in journals such as Risk Analysis and Risk 
Research and risk social scientists whose papers are printed in journals such as Sociology of Health and Illness 
and Health, Risk & Society. The latter, including the present authors, have focussed on interpretive issues for 
over two decades, but have had relatively little impact on government, public services or industry. 
7
 Although multiple contingencies or a continuous range may be envisaged, decision-making often requires 
binary decisional choices, e.g. about whether to follow screening with a diagnostic test or not, which force 
probability ranges into ‘high’ and ‘low’ risk categories. 
8
 Most physicists believe that multiple possibilities can ‘exist’ at the quantum level, with measurable effects, 
but this troubling belief does not impact directly on the cookbook world of risk analysis. 
9
 Because every event is different, history can only appear to repeat itself after occurrences have been 
categorised and thereby rendered ‘the same’. 
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My guess is that we have a folk theory of categorization itself. It says that things 
come in well-defined kinds, that the kinds are characterized by shared 
properties, and that there is one right taxonomy … It is easier to show what is 
wrong with a scientific theory than with a folk theory. A folk theory defines 
common sense itself. When the folk theory and the technical theory converge, it 
gets even tougher to see where that theory gets in the way - or even that it is a 
theory at all. 
 
Marking out gaps between what happens and its categorisation opens up an 
important but neglected field for social scientific study (Heyman et al., 2010, chapter 
2). Risk categorisation entails a conjoint, usually unarticulated, societal process of 
contingency selection, differentiation from ‘non-events’ and homogenisation of intra-
category variation. Categorisation manufactures risks as identical, distinctive entities 
which can be counted so that their probabilities can be inductively estimated. In the 
absence of this process, there can be no risk to manage, although undesired events 
may well continue to occur.  
 
The reliance of risk assessment on contestable prior categorisation can be easily 
demonstrated. For example, those who view depression as a medical condition 
differentiate it from ordinary sadness. Parker’s conclusion (Parker and Hickie, 2007) 
that 95% of Australian teachers regularly reported symptoms which would have 
justified a diagnosis of depression challenges its differentiation from everyday gloom. 
Similarly, non-detection of Rosenhan’s (1973) pseudo-patients demonstrated that 
mere presence in a psychiatric institution was sufficient to trigger the diagnosis of 
mental disorder. In the domain of physical health, Davis et al. (2002) found that 
some members of sero-concordant HIV-positive couples considered sex with their 
partner to be safe on the grounds that both were already infected, whilst others were 
worried that one partner might have a more virulent sub-strain. Hence, risk 
perceptions were shaped by the extent to which the infection was homogenised. This 
analysis does not imply that one categorisation is as good as another, merely that all 
involve some reduction in information and therefore have only imperfect connections 
to the material world. But risks can only be ‘managed’ after they have been 
constituted into categorised packages through the conjoint socio-cognitive process of 
selection, homogenisation and differentiation. A similar point was made nearly 100 
years ago in relation to the theory of entrepreneurship by one of the earliest modern 
writers about risk (Knight, 1921).  
 
Given that contingency is infinite, since anything might happen, candidate risks have 
to become societally embedded in order to ‘survive’. The socio-political processes 
through which risks become consolidated into organised social life have been little 
researched or even analysed, but some suggestions, along with contested 
examples, are offered in Table 2 below.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The proposed analysis differentiates individual identification of a risk ‘event’ from its 
establishment as a societally organised presence. This distinction is well-exemplified 
by the first original article in this special issue. De Graaff and Bröer explored 
sufferers’ attempts to obtain recognition for what they see as an overlooked serious 
risk, of electro-hypersensitivity from exposure to electromagnetic fields (EMFs). 
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Although self-defined sufferers’ efforts to achieve societal recognition of this risk are 
perhaps doomed to failure, their methods for attempting to establish risk reality, such 
as using EMF detectors which make a lot of noise, resonate with more ‘successful’ 
risks.  
 
Desmond, Prost and Wight (2012) investigated the entanglement of two overlapping 
but distinct disease categorisations drawn upon by poor people in rural Tanzania, 
namely malaria and nzoka. These two adverse events are predicated on very 
different cosmologies linked to parasites and witchcraft respectively. A striking 
finding of their research is syncretism between Western-medical and indigenous 
belief systems within an overarching risk framework. This composite generates new 
risk concerns, for instance arising from the belief that the injections which help with 
malaria will cause deadly harm to children afflicted by nzoka.  
 
Kayali and Iqbal (2012) studied the self-categorisation of depression. Their research 
involved inviting women diagnosed with this condition to describe the triggers, if any, 
for the onset of their condition. The authors concluded that these explanations fell 
into two types, depending upon whether a woman identified any triggers or none. 
Women who identified triggers were more likely to  anticipate that they would 
eventually recover from their condition. Superficially, this sub-categorisation of 
depression appears similar to the old medical division between exogenous and 
endogenous depression. However, the qualitative findings show that many of the 
‘triggers’ would not be medically recognised. For example, one British woman saw 
distress about the 9/11 attack on New York as having triggered her depression, even 
though she was not personally connected to this event. Hence, the research 
highlights the importance of the interpretive frameworks through which individuals 
link adverse event categories to risk factors.        
 
Skolbekken, Østerlie and Forsmo (2012) investigated older women’s understandings 
of the relationship between measured wrist bone mineral density (BMD) and the two 
‘conditions’ of osteopenia and osteoporosis, defined by WHO in terms of being 
respectively 1-2.5 and >2.5 standard deviations below the young adult mean. As 
happens in other cases such as that of high cholesterol, a purported risk factor has 
acquired the status of an adverse event in its own right, despite being only 
imperfectly linked to the primary concern, in this case vulnerability to fractures. This 
diagnostic system well-illustrates the categorising processes which underpin the 
manufacture of ‘events’. Continuous measurements are homogenised into discrete, 
differentiated categories with inevitably arbitrary dividing lines, which are required to 
guide clinical decisions such as whether medication should be prescribed. The 
research shows how women struggled to understand these homogenisation and 
differentiation processes. They knew that bone mineral density could vary at different 
body sites, rather than just at the wrist, questioned the proposed link between BMD 
and fractures on the basis of their own experience, and puzzled as to why a small 
change could put them over the boundary into ‘having’ a disease. Differences in the 
reference group used for calibrating BMD deviations, and even the inverse variation 
between a high (standard deviation) score and a good outcome stimulated doubts 
and scepticism. 
 
Finally, Scammell and Alaszewski (2012) investigated the categorisation of risk itself, 
by midwives in relation to high and low risk pregnancies. The issue in question for 
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this research was not the presence of a particular risk to mother and/or baby, but 
generic riskiness from any possible source. The paper draws a powerful contrast 
between an abstract commitment to ‘normal birth’ within the midwifery profession, on 
the one hand, and the indefiniteness of contingency on the other. Since so many 
things might go wrong, normalcy could only be ever attributed tentatively until the 
birth was safely completed. The distinction between high relative risk and low 
absolute risk was  obscured by fear of litigation and professional misconduct 
charges. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is 20 years since the Royal Society produced its Risk report. As the interview with 
Nick Pidgeon presented in this special issue illustrates, the debate about risk-
thinking has moved on considerably since that period, partly as a result of the 
controversy which the report generated. Conceptualisations which make the 
observer integral to the social construction of risks are now widely recognised. 
Nevertheless, particular risks tend to acquire facticity as ‘virtual objects’ (Van Loon, 
2002), perhaps because a robust status is a requisite for organising social responses 
to contingency, i.e. to what merely might happen. The research papers presented in 
this special issue series will probe risk construction in relation to categorising, 
valuing, uncertain expecting and time-framing. 
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                                                 TABLE 1 
             TWO VIEWS OF RISK ELEMENTS (Heyman et al., 2011, p. 21) 
 
Risk viewed as referring to  
natural phenomena 
Risk viewed as referring to  
Interpretations 
                                RISK CONSTRUCTION 
Event Category 
Adversity Value 
Probability Expectation 
Time period Time frame 
                                      RISK MANAGEMENT 
Service delivery 
Evidence-based practice 
Service organisation 
Practice encoding 
Information-giving Information representation 
Regulation and safety Control 
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TABLE 2 
RISK CONSOLIDATION SUB-PROCESSES (based on Heyman et al., 2011, p. 44) 
 
Consolidation Process Contested Example 
Risk factor-outcome linkage Sun exposure-melanoma 
Adversity foregrounding Cannabis-psychosis 
Threshold setting Insulin level-diabetes 
Risk individualisation and moralisation Obesity 
Risk-prevention linkage Dietary fat-coronary heart disease 
Institutional embedding Breast cancer screening 
Commercial entrenchment Pharmaceutical marketing 
Iconography accumulation Learning (intellectual) disabilities 
  
   
Note: Based on Heyman et al. (2011, p. 44). 
 
